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Thai listed companies for the period 2009-2015, we show that family firms in Thailand have
lower debt financing cost compared to non-family firms. The lower cost of external debt
financing predominates in highly profitable family firms insofar that these firms are reputable
and concerned with their long-term survivorship. Further, family firms benefit from the strong
and trustworthy relationships they established with creditors, which help to alleviate information
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1. Introduction
To the extent that financial policy is crucial for firm survivorship and growth in both the
short- and long-term, it is meaningful to understand controlling shareholders’ financial decisions
particularly for family firms, who assert dominance in most countries especially in emerging
markets (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan & Wong 2002; Williams et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev
2019). Many studies have investigated the performance of firms controlled by families relative to
other types of controlling shareholders by focusing on the agency conflicts between controlling
families and other investors (Anderson & Reeb 2003; King & Santor 2008; Lins et al. 2013; De
Massis et al. 2018; Kotlar et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). While extant literature has
examined the financial implications of family control from the perspective of equity holders
(Villalonga & Amit 2006; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015; Dawson et al. 2018), the literature on the
consequences of controlling families on creditors is sparse, which motivates this study. These
issues are pertinent in emerging markets where the institutional environment is underdeveloped,
and the arm’s length market-driven system is deficient. In such an environment, lending
relationships and long-term affinities between controlling families and creditors are important for
firms’ ability to access external debt financing. In this paper, we identify an important channel
through which family control wields influence on the cost of debt in emerging markets.
Theoretical predictions on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt
is ambiguous with inconclusive empirical evidence. On the one hand, controlling families pursue
their personal benefits and use their power to expropriate other investors (Johnson et al. 2000).
These expropriation incentives can reduce the ability of family firms to pay off debt, and raise
the expected costs associated with financial distress and bankruptcy (Purnanandam 2008). As a
result, creditors incorporate these cost expectations into their lending decisions, and thus require
higher financing costs of debt (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Lin et al. 2011). On the other hand,
controlling families might be concerned about long-term survivorship, maintaining the family’s
reputation, and passing on wealth to descendants (Anderson et al. 2003), since they have a large
and highly undiversified investment in the firms (Shleifer & Vishny 1986). Accordingly, family
firms often maintain long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationships with creditors. In so
doing, family firms can access lower cost of debt financing (Anderson et al. 2003; Behr &
Güttler 2007; Ellul et al. 2007; Croci et al. 2011).

Between family firms’ propensity to

expropriate incentives which leads to higher costs of debt and their concerns for reputation and
long-term survivorship which leads family ownership to adopt policies that improve firm value
leading to favorable credit terms, the net impact of family control on cost of debt is difficult to
predict theoretically, and instead becomes a matter of empirical investigation.
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In the case of Thailand, its institutional environment presents a number of interesting
dimensions which motivates our investigation of this important issue. First, family firms play an
important role in Thailand’s economy. Our sample shows that by the end of 2015, there are 212
family firms which accounts for 63.28% of total sample firms, and 202 of these family firms
have family members involved in managing the business. Thai family firms have been listed on
the stock exchanges for more than 30 years and have made significant contribution to the Thai
economy. Specifically by the end of 2015, Thailand’s 50 richest people who own large family
business groups contribute more than 25% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), and
constitute 33% of market capitalization of listed companies. 1 Taken together, the significant
presence of family control in the Thai economy warrants an investigation of the financial
conditions of these family firms which are linked to their long-term survivorship and reputation.
Second, Thailand is a typical emerging market featured with less developed regulatory
and

legal

system,

opaque

information

environment

and

weak

investor

protection

(Wiwattanakantang 2001; Anuchitworawong et al. 2003). Consequently, controlling families
may also have strong incentives to pursue their private benefits at the expense of debtholders (La
Porta et al. 2000; Connelly et al. 2012). As such, the disparity in the behavior of family firms in
emerging markets like Thailand from those in developed markets deserves further investigation.
In addition, the Thai equity markets are underdeveloped to the extent that Thai firms rely
heavily on external debt financing (Anuchitworawong et al. 2003; Charumilind et al. 2006;
Mahathanaseth & Tauer 2012). By the end of 2015, bank loans are considered to be the most
important source of new capital and it constitutes 54% of new external financing and bond
financing constitutes 15%2, while equity financing constitutes 30%3. To access external debt
financing in Thailand, the arm’s length market-driven system implies that relationship with
debtholders plays an important role in providing external finance for firms, which presents as an
informal governance mechanism (Charumilind et al. 2006; Schwert 2018). However, after 2004,
the Thai government launched reforms in the banking sector to increase the number of banks and
financial institutions controlled by non-family entities (such as the government and foreigners) to
dilute the concentrated family control of financial institutions (Lu & Mieno 2018). Such a policy
change presents an interesting setting to evaluate how these non-family banks provide financial
support to family firms, where the basic objective is to ensure their sustained growth and
contribution to the economy. On these issues, an examination of the relationship between

1

See more details at Forbes Thailand, https://www.forbes.com/thailand-billionaires/list/.
Thai Bond Market Association, http://www.thaibma.or.th/Doc/annual/SummaryMarket2016.pdf.
3
Bank of Thailand, https://www.bot.or.th/Thai/FinancialInstitutions/Publications/FSR_Doc/FSR2015.pdf.
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controlling families and creditors can provide new insights into the literature on agency conflicts
and inform regulators on the design of sustainable financial policies in emerging markets.
Expanding on earlier analyses, we focus on three dimensions of family control, namely
family ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and family management, and their
respective effects on the cost of debt. The first type of family control is the family ownership
structure which is measured by two proxies. Following Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Villalonga
and Amit (2006), we define the first proxy by a family firm dummy which equals one if the
founder and/or family members by either blood or marriage is the blockholder. Another proxy is
family ownership, which is defined as the control rights held by the controlling families. The
second type of family control is control-ownership wedge, which is defined as the divergence
between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling families (Claessens et al. 2002;
Villalonga & Amit 2006; Lin et al. 2011). The third type of family control is family
management, which is defined by a dummy that equals one when a family member acts as a
chairman, CEO or director (Villalonga & Amit 2006).
When measuring the cost of debt, we consider the interest rate of all debt outstanding as
an indicator of cost of debt. Due to data paucity on the different types of debt instruments
employed by Thai firms, data on costs relating to each class of debt contract are not available.
Nevertheless, bank loans make up for more than half of new capital and thus dominate the
external debt financing of Thai firms. As such the total cost of debt is expected to be dominated
by the costs of bank loans. Using a sample of 2,167 firm-year observations in Thailand from
2009 to 2015, we discover that cost of debt is significantly lower for family firms relative to nonfamily firms. Further analysis shows that agency cost of debt is lower in family firms when they
have a greater degree of family ownership, have larger control-ownership wedge, and have
family members on the board and/or management team. These results continue to hold true even
when we control for possible confounding effect of lenders who are related to family business
groups. Using firms’ profitability as a proxy for firm’s reputation and long-term survivorship
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003), we find that highly profitable family firms tend to enjoy lower cost
of debt. These results suggest that Thai controlling families are concerned about long-term
survivorship and reputation to the extent that they seek to establish long-term relationships with
creditors as they stand to benefit, and are less likely to expropriate other investors. Our main
findings are robust to using alternative estimation methods, alternative sampling methods, the
use of exogenous events such as political uncertainty caused by turnover of political leaders and
coup d’état, alternative measurements of family control, and alternative control variable by using
different definitions of firm size. Our findings emphasize that family control is vital and can
determine sustainable financing decisions which is consistent with Anderson et al. (2003).
5

Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we contribute
to studies on the financial implications of family ownership structure and its influence on
external financing costs. In general, existing research presents two views whereby family
ownership is deemed to be either beneficial or detrimental. In the US where ownership is
dispersed and investor protection is stronger, family ownership can enhance firm value by
reducing financing costs (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson & Reeb
2003; Ellul et al. 2007). In other international context, especially emerging markets where
ownership is concentrated and controlling families have incentives to expropriate other investors,
family ownership could lead to higher financing costs (Purnanandam 2008; Lin et al. 2011; Pan
& Tian 2016). Our study chooses an emerging market – Thailand – where family ownership is
prevalent, the institutional environment is underdeveloped and investor protection is weak
(Charumilind et al. 2006), and we provide interesting evidence that family control is an efficient
institution that mitigates such conflict of interest resulting in lower financing cost. This is also in
direct contrast to the evidence in other emerging markets arguing that family firms are likely to
engage in expropriation of other investors (Pan & Tian 2016). Taken together, our study shows
evidence that, under these conditions, a very strong interest of Thai controlling families to
survive in the long-run may motivate them to manage the firms by safeguarding their long-term
survivorship and reputation to the extent that these could lead to lower cost of debt. Our study
enriches the literature on agency theory with reference to the agency conflict between controlling
families and creditors. This work has important implications for practitioners and policy-makers
in emerging markets to develop sustainable economic policies.
Second, we provide greater insight into literature about the behavior of family firms and
firm decision-making. Previous studies have considered the effects of general corporate
governance and the impact of family ownership structure on business performance (Anderson &
Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Connelly et al. 2012). However, they do not examine the
channels through which firm performance is affected. In our study, we identify an important
channel affecting such performance by empirically examining the impact of family control on
firms’ cost of debt financing. Unlike Connelly et al. (2012) who study the relationship between
ownership structure and corporate governance practices on firm performance in Thailand, we
focus on the role of family control directly in more detail. To provide more insights into family
control, we focus on three dimensions: family ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and
family management. Unlike Pan and Tian (2016) who examine the impact of family control on
loan collateral in China where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to access debt
financing than private firms, which stems from the intervention of state-owned banks to the
allocation of loans, we study the institutional setting of Thailand where SOEs are not dominant
6

like China. Furthermore, we document the empirical evidence of lower cost of debt resulting
from family control by considering the channels in which Thai controlling families take a longterm survivorship and reputation approach. Specifically, we use firms’ profitability as a proxy
for firms’ reputation and long-term survivorship and we show the negative association between
family control and cost of debt predominates in highly profitable firms. In this way our study
provides a complementary perspective to the literature about the behavior of family firms and the
influence of family control on their financing decision-making.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the
ownership structure of family firms in Thailand and institutional background. Section 3 reviews
the current and relevant literature on which the hypotheses are established. Section 4 describes
the data and methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes this
paper.
2. Institutional background
2.1 Family control in Thailand
Family control is prevalent in Thailand and important for the country’s economic
development, particularly in capital markets. Based on ownership structure, family firms are
dominant players in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), and they comprise about 60.27% of
Thai non-financial listed companies by the end of 2015. Family firms which are typically
controlled and managed entirely by founding families (Claessens et al. 2000) tend to rely on
external equity financing for additional capital and growth opportunities (Connelly et al. 2012).
The relationships between people in family firms can still be tracked by surnames of controlling
families, which are unique and protected by Thai law (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). These types
of firms contribute to the country’s GDP growth and total market capitalization of listed
companies in Thailand, by more than 25% and 33%, respectively (Forbes Thailand 2015).
Thai firms are characterized by dominant ownership concentration (Claessens et al.
2000). Under the country’s weak law enforcement environment and high ownership
concentration, controlling families maintain their influence and control firms directly by holding
firms’ shares and/or indirectly via disproportional ownership structures. These can include a
pyramidal structure and cross-holding via business groups (Connelly et al. 2012). A point in case
is Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited (see Figure 1). The company is a part of Thai
business groups referred to as the Chinteik Brothers Group, which was founded by the Nganthavi
family. Based on ownership information for 2015, the Nganthavi family owns 11.15% of
Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited directly and controls 31.16% of Southern
7

Concrete Pile Public Company Limited indirectly through the group’s privately held holding
companies. The family also enjoys more votes concerning the management of Southern Concrete
Pile Public Company Limited indirectly through this pyramidal structure. It holds 12.79% of
shares in Thai Wire Products Public Company Limited, which is the publicly traded company
that owns 1.19% of Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited. In total the Nganthavi
family controls 43.50% of Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited. At the same time,
there are cross-holdings because Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited also holds
9.99% of Thai Wire Products Public Company Limited.
[Insert Figure 1]
It is a common practice in Thailand for businesses to be closely tied to extensive families
and this link is established through marriages, which are considered to be the most trustworthy
form of family connections. Thus, family members, typically, are involved in firm management
by serving on the board of directors or as CEOs in Thai family firms rather than hiring external
professional managers (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). For instance,
about 96.40% of family firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) have members
working on the board of directors or management team in 2015. These imply that families can
exert power over listed companies, and it is difficult for the board of directors to be independent.
2.2 Financial system in Thailand
In Thailand, the financial sector mainly consists of domestic commercial banks and
financial companies. Originally, most domestic commercial banks and financial companies were
established by family groups. Based on family connections via blood ties, imprudent lending by
financial institutions is evident, mainly in the form of credit loans granted at low interest rates
and without any collateral or guarantees. This has led to a high ratio of non-performing loans
(NPLs) which, amongst other factors, gave rise the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Charumilind et
al. 2006). Since then, the Bank of Thailand (BOT, the central bank in Thailand) actively
strengthened the regulation of financial institutions via implementing a series of reforms, such as
the imposition of upper limits of shareholding for banks and financial companies (at 5 percent
and 10 percent for individual shareholders respectively), abolition of the interest rate ceiling, the
requirement to have bank reserves and the abrogation of restrictions on foreign ownership of
commercial banks. Furthermore, after 2004, the BOT launched the financial sector Master Plans
to reforms in the finance industry to improve its efficiency and corporate governance practices.
8

For instance, the ownership of some Thai financial institutions was transferred from Thai
families to foreigners or the government. Banks are required to reduce outstanding loans to
connected companies otherwise they are required to have their senior executives surrender their
company directorships if they held more than 1% of the company equity. The members of the
board in both financial and non-financial listed companies are also required to have at least onethird ratio of independent directors who are unrelated to firms’ major shareholders or who are
not employed by the companies. The reforms also cover granting new banking licenses for both
domestic and foreign commercial banks and broadening the scope of commercial bank business.
Consequently, the number of commercial banks increased from 13 in 2003 to 19 in 2015, and 6
out of 19 banks have foreigners as the largest shareholders by the end of 2015.
However, Thailand’s financial sector remains concentrated and far from competing
fairly. Based on the financial stability report issued by the BOT, the five largest banks still
account for about 69% of total assets in the banking system in 2015.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
3.1 Literature review
The separation of ownership and control, which can lead to conflict of interest between
managers and shareholders, has long been viewed as the key to analyzing modern corporations
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, in other economies where controlling families assert
dominance, especially in emerging markets (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio & Lang 2002;
Anderson & Reeb 2003; De Massis et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019), the primary agency
conflict is between large shareholders and other investors (Villalonga & Amit 2006).
Interestingly, due to economic firm goals and non-economic family goals (such as family
harmony and social status), family firms have unique characteristics and agency problems
compared to non-family firms (Villalonga & Amit 2006).
Empirical evidence on the relationship between family control and cost of debt remains
inconclusive. On the one hand, family control can increase the expropriation of other investors
by pursuing personal benefits and engaging in tunneling and moral hazard, for instance
transferring a firm’s resources out or committing funds to unprofitable projects that provide
private benefits which bear financial risk (Johnson et al. 2000). As a result, these can exacerbate
the risk of agency conflicts between controlling families and creditors and raise the cost of debt
associated with the expected costs of financial distress and bankruptcy (Purnanandam 2008).
Additionally, bank loan spread is higher for firms experiencing a wider divergence between
control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders, which is due to: the entrenchment
9

incentive of shareholders able to reduce efficiency; and the ability of firms to pay debt, and
increase financial distress and bankruptcy (Lin et al. 2011). Also, compared to non-family firms,
family firms are required to offer more collateral since creditors incorporate the credit risk of
expropriation of family control via control-ownership wedge and family management (Pan &
Tian 2016).
Conversely, family control can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce cost of debt because
controlling families are concerned with the firms’ reputation, long-term commitment, and
ensuring the descendants inherit their wealth (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Anderson et al. 2003;
Ellul et al. 2007). These can lead to lower monitoring costs for banks and less asymmetric
information (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Furthermore, lending relationship and long-term
affinities between controlling families and creditors can bring benefits to family firms such as
more capital (Schwert 2018), longer investment horizons (Faccio 2010), more access to longterm debt (Charumilind et al. 2006), efficient investment (James Jr 1999) and better monitoring
of managerial activities (Fama & Jensen 1983). It is possible that family firms often maintain
long-lasting and trustworthy relationships with their banks to access debt funding and survive for
many years to come (Behr & Güttler 2007; Croci et al. 2011). As a result, creditors view the
incentive structure of family firms as being less prone to expropriation of creditors, thereby
leading to reduced agency cost of debt (Charumilind et al. 2006).
As can be seen from the tension of the arguments above, to understand the impact of
family firms on financial policy, specifically how family control affects cost of debt remains an
important topic worthy of investigation.
3.2 Hypotheses development
Thailand is an emerging market characterized by an underdeveloped institutional and
regulatory environment, poor control of corporate practices, and weak protection of investors.
Yet it is dominated by family firms who make substantial contribution to the country’s economy
(Wiwattanakantang 2001). This is different from other typical emerging markets such as China
where government-owned firms dominate, and family firms usually face discrimination against
accessing external finance (Pan & Tian 2016). Thus, we contend that family firms in Thailand
could access external finance potentially at a lower cost.
Moreover, Thai family firms have been established for a very long time and expanded
their businesses rapidly. For many decades now, family firms have been and will continue to be
very concerned about their long-term survivorship and long-lasting relationships with other
stakeholders, such as creditors, to maintain continuous access to external finance
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(Anuchitworawong et al. 2003; Charumilind et al. 2006). Such a lending relationship plays a
vital role as an informal mechanism of governance via a network of social relationships (Faccio
2010; Schwert 2018), so that family firms have lower default risks and lower costs associated
with financial distress or bankruptcy (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Connelly et al. 2012;
Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). This can mitigate credit concerns raised by creditors when lending
to family firms, which is likely to result in lower cost of debt. As such, we formulate the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Cost of debt is lower in family firms than in non-family firms.
In Thailand, controlling families can reinforce their control via holding more control
rights and are likely to implement control-ownership wedge via pyramidal and cross-holding
structures in their firms (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Connelly et al. (2012) opine that in a weak
legal environment, controlling families can exert their influence on firms through a controlownership wedge in order to reduce any dilution of family control. Family members’ authority is
preserved through blood ties and marriages, which are considered to be a highly trusted form of
family connection (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). In addition, controlling family involvement in
management can further exert a strong influence on the board of directors (Claessens et al.
2002). Overall, we argue that families are more concerned about their survivorship and thus have
even lower credit risks when controlling families have a larger control-ownership wedge or have
family members on the boards. Thus, we form the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Cost of debt is lower in family firms with a larger control-ownership wedge.
Hypothesis 3: Cost of debt is lower in family firms when family members are the chairperson,
CEO or directors.
4. Sample and methodology
4.1 Data and sample selection
Our sample comprises non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET) from 2009 to 2015. The firm financial data are collected from Bloomberg. Firm
ownership data are hand-collected by searching the information from SET Market Analysis and
Reporting Tool (SETSMART) which is produced by the SET. This database provides
information on the stakes of shareholders with at least 0.5%. For each firm in each year, we
manually collect the ownership of controlling shareholders including both control rights and cash
11

flow rights. We also collect information on the identity of the controlling shareholders to identify
family firms, and for family firms, we manually collect information of whether their members
work in the management team. To verify that the information on family control is reliable and
accurate, we compare the information we collected with firms’ homepages on their websites, the
commercial register and newspapers. We are able to identify all recorded shareholders for each
year throughout the sample period. Then we merge the ownership data with each company’s
financial data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to reduce the
impact of outliers. We exclude firms with irregular financial reporting habits and missing data
for the variables employed in our baseline empirical specification. Our final sample comprises
2,167 firm-year observations for 335 listed firms.
4.2 Measurement of variables
4.2.1 Cost of debt
Previous studies measure the cost of debt using proxies like the yield spread, the
difference between the weighted-average debt yield and U.S. treasury yield (Anderson et al.
2003) or the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) (Lin et al. 2011) as a benchmark. However,
in emerging markets, the debt market is not as developed. Following Zou and Adams (2008), we
measure the cost of debt as the ratio of interest expense to total debt.4
4.2.2 Key independent variables
4.2.2.1 Family ownership structure
Following the work of Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define a firm as a family firm if a
founder and/or family member by either blood or marriage is the blockholder. Despite an
extensive literature on family firms, there is no consistent cut-off point of family ownership
structure due to different degrees of ownership concentration in developed and developing
countries (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Fan & Wong 2002). In accordance with the Thai legal
system and implemented in the SET, a shareholder with 25% of the voting rights has substantial
control over the firm, thus we use 25% cut-off point of control rights, which is consistent with
Wiwattanakantang (2001) who examines family ownership in Thailand. In this study, we use
two different measures of family ownership structure. The first is a dummy variable, Family,
capturing the presence of controlling families and takes the value of one if a family owns more
4
Thai company accounting disclosures do not give a breakdown of interest charges relating to each class of debt
contract (e.g. bank loans, bonds, notes payable, and borrowing from non-bank institutions).
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than 25% of the control rights, and zero otherwise. The second is a continuous variable,
ControlR, measuring the control rights held by the controlling families, following Anderson et
al. (2009).
4.2.2.2 Control-ownership wedge
To measure the presence of controlling and powerful families, we use Wedge to measure
disproportional ownership structure or control-ownership wedge. This variable is calculated as
the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders (Claessens
et al. 2002; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Accordingly, control rights are defined as the weakest link
of the ownership chain while cash flow rights are defined as the products of all ownership levels
along the ownership chain. For example, if firm A owns 35% of firm B directly, and firm B
owns 50% of firm C directly, then the control rights held by firm A on firm C is 35% (the
weakest ownership level) and the cash flow rights is 10.5% (= 35% * 50%, the products of all
the ownership levels).
4.2.2.3 Family management
In this study, following Villalonga and Amit (2006), we create a dummy variable
Family_CEO which proxies for family management. It is equal to one if the firm has a family
member who acts as a chairperson, CEO or director, and zero otherwise.
4.2.3 Control variables
Firm characteristics, beside family control, can wield a potential impact on the cost of
debt (Anderson et al. 2003; Pittman & Fortin 2004; Lin et al. 2011). Following the literature, we
include a set of firm characteristics as control variables in our regression. We include Size which
is calculated as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, following Petersen and Rajan
(1994). Larger firms tend to be more established, are stronger financially and with lower default
risk, and, thus enjoy lower interest rates than smaller businesses (Petersen & Rajan 1994). For
the robustness check, we replace Size with Size_growth which is another proxy to measure firm
size. Size_growth is defined as the natural logarithm of firms’ debt and equity, following
Anderson et al. (2003).
We include tangible assets intensity (Tangible), measured as tangible assets divided by
total assets. Firms with more tangible assets may provide more collateral which decreases the
cost of debt (Zou & Adams 2008; Kim et al. 2011)
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Leverage (Lev), calculated as total debt/total assets, is included in the model to control
for the risk of bankruptcy (Chava et al. 2008). Firms that have lower debt intensity present lower
risk to debt providers, and, thus, are more likely to have lower cost of debt (Chava et al. 2008;
Graham et al. 2008).
Current ratio (Current), measured by current assets over current liabilities, is controlled
as a proxy of liquidity because firms with more liquidity tend to enjoy lower cost of debt
(Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca 2011).
We also control for profitability (EBITDA) which is calculated as earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets, following Graham et al. (2008).
Debt providers are more likely to charge a lower interest rate to firms with higher profits
(Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011).
In addition, firms with better growth opportunities can have lower borrowing cost
(Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011). Such firms may be vulnerable to financial distress or be
associated with information asymmetry (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca 2011). For this
reason, we include two variables to measure the growth opportunities of firms. MB is measured
as the market value of equity plus book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets,
following Graham et al. (2008). Another variable to measure growth opportunities is Growth
which is defined as percentage change of total sales, following Kim et al. (2011). The year
dummy and industry dummy are also included.5 The definitions for these variables, as well as all
other variables used in this study, are presented in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the distributions of family control including family ownership structure,
control-ownership wedge and family management. Panel A shows the distribution of our sample
firms between family firms and non-family firms; there are 1,306 firm-year observations for
family firms and 861 firm-year observations for non-family firms. The percentage of family
firms increases slightly from 59.11% (170/286) in 2009 to 63.28% (212/335) in 2015. Panel B
shows the average percentage of control-ownership wedge within family firms is 5.77% and the
percentage of family firms with family management is 96.40% (1,259/1,306), respectively. In the
sample period, there are a few changes in the levels of control-ownership wedge and family
management in Thailand each year. Additionally, among those firms that change their ownership
5

The industry dummy is based on the industry classification of the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
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type, family members often maintain their involvement in management as the board of directors,
CEO and/or chairperson.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the distribution of family firms and non-family firms by
industry. The number and percentage of family firms vary significantly from industry to
industry. The consumer products industry group has by far the largest number of family firms at
about 78%. Compared to non-family firms, family firms dominate in most of the industry groups
in Thailand, particularly in property & construction, which represents the largest industry
according to the total number of listed firms.
Panel D of Table 2 reports the number and percentage of firm-year observations by bankconnected lending within family firms in our sample. Consistent with the post-2004 banking
sector reform which increases the number of banks and financial institutions controlled by nonfamily entities and the dilution of concentrated family control of financial institutions, our
sample contains only a small proportion of connected lending via family business groups (i.e.
5.2% of the total sample which amounts to 68 firm-year observations).
[Insert Table 2]
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A indicates that the mean
(median) of the cost of debt is 6.04% (4.50%). This is higher than the mean (median) cost of debt
in China which is 3.40% (3.3%) as reported by Zou and Adams (2008). In addition, most firms
in our sample are family firms which make up 59.9% of the sample. The average percentage of
control rights held by family firms is 28.84% while the median is 33%; these statistics indicate
the high concentration of business ownership in Thailand. The average percentage of controlownership wedge held by families is 5.77%, which reflects a high disproportional ownership in
Thailand. Interestingly, the number of firms with family management is 96.6% of the sample.
Panel B shows that the average firm size is 8.54. The average tangible assets intensity is 37.72%.
Leverage for the median firm in our sample is 47.15%, while the average current ratio is about
2%. On average, profitability (EBITDA) and growth opportunity are nearly 9% and around 7%,
respectively. The average market-to-book ratio is 1.43. Panel C summarizes the distribution of
our sample firms by owners. There are 1,306 family firm-year observations, which make up
60.27% of the total sample. These statistics are slightly higher than Wiwattanakantang (2001)
which reflects the growing presence of family firms in the Thai economy. The remaining 39.73%
of our total sample are non-family firms comprising 861 non-family firm-year observations. For
those non-family firms, there are 125 government firms, 321 foreign investor firms, and 15 cofounder firms. In addition to this, 400 firms are classified as widely held non-family firms in our
sample.
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[Insert Table 3]
Table 4 reports the results of the univariate analysis of key variables between family and
non-family firms in order to provide some preliminary evidence for our hypotheses. The results
show that family firms on average pay lower cost of debt (i.e. 0.731% lower) than non-family
firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is 2.99). Also, family
firms are, on average, significantly smaller in size than non-family firms by 0.32 points.
Furthermore, family firms have significantly higher current ratio and profit than non-family
firms by 0.29 points and 1.52%, respectively, implying that family firms may prefer a low-risk
capital structure. Again, these differences are statistically significant. Compared to non-family
firms, family firms also have significantly higher growth potential as measured by Growth and
MB by 2.52% and 0.14 points, respectively. There is no statistically significant difference in
tangible assets intensity and leverage ratio between family and non-family firms.
[Insert Table 4]
5. Empirical results
5.1 Family control and cost of debt
In Section 3.2, we hypothesize that, in Thailand, the three types of family control are
more likely to have a negative relationship with the cost of debt. To test this conjecture, we
estimate the below linear model, following Anderson et al. (2003), Charumilind et al. (2006) and
Lin et al. (2011), which makes our results directly comparable with prior empirical evidence:
Cost of debti,t = β0 + β1Family_Controli,t-1 + β2Sizei,t-1 + β3Tangiblei,t-1 + β4Levi,t-1 +
β5Currenti,t-1 + β6EBITDAi,t-1 + β7MBi,t-1 + β8Growthi,t-1 +
Dummy(year)+ Dummy(industry) + εi,t-1

(1)

The definitions for these variables, as well as all the other variables employed in this
study, are presented in Table 1.6 To determine how controlling families exert their influence on
the cost of debt and establish causality, we use one-year lagged values of family control as well

6

Correlations amongst the variables are not presented but are available upon request. The results report that firm’s
cost of debt has a negative correlation with all three types of family control: family ownership structure (as denoted
by Family and ControlR); control-ownership wedge (as denoted by Wedge); and family management (as proxied by
Family_CEO).
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as other control variables in our empirical estimation. Thus, the number of observations used in
the regression analysis reduced to 1,806.
The multivariate analysis of this regression is reported in Table 5. The relationship
between family ownership and cost of debt are reported in columns 1 and 2. Looking at column
1, the estimated coefficient of Family is -0.07 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.65). In
column 2, we also find that the estimated coefficient of ControlR is -0.17 and is significant at the
1% level (t-value is -3.23), which implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR is
associated with a 4.4 percentage point decrease in the cost of debt. The results in columns 1 and
2 indicate that Thai listed firms have a lower cost of debt when controlling families are present
and when controlling families hold more shares. These results support our hypothesis H1. Our
results are qualitatively similar to those of Anderson et al. (2003) who attribute the lower cost of
debt of family firms relative to non-family firms to reputational concerns. The difference in
institutional environment can shape the behavior of family firms differently (Lin et al. 2011).
Anderson et al. (2003) focuses on the U.S., which has a much stronger law enforcement
environment, so the property rights of family firms can be better protected and controlling
families are thus more concerned about long-term survivorship and reputation. This can be
confirmed by Anderson and Reeb (2003) who further find fewer agency conflicts between
families and other investors.
[Insert Table 5]
However, under a weak institutional environment, and deficient arm’s length marketdriven system in Thailand, controlling families are inclined to establish trustworthy relationships
with their creditors because they stand to benefit from this relationship. As such Thai controlling
families are prone to taking a long-term survivorship and low-risk approach in their business
activities. Our results are different from the findings of Ellul et al. (2007), who document that
family firms in countries with weak institutional environment experience higher cost of debt than
non-family firms. However, Ellul et al. (2007) focus on financial markets in both developed and
developing economies. Our results pertain to Thailand, a single economy, and control for the
unique institutional environment and financial market characteristics that may not be
representative of the sample of emerging economies in the study by Ellul et al. (2007). As such
the results from this study demonstrate the unique relationship that exists between Thai family
firms and their lenders. Our results corroborate the findings documented by Petersen and Rajan
(1994), who indicate that ties between firms and their lenders can affect the availability and cost
of funds to the firms.
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Column 3 focuses on firms with control-ownership wedge. The estimated coefficient of
Wedge is -0.16 and is statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.88). This implies that
a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge induces a 1.7 percentage point decrease in cost of
debt. It is a result suggesting that Thai family firms have lower cost of debt with larger controlownership wedge. This supports our hypothesis H2. Our results are different from the findings of
Lin et al. (2011), who show that firms with a larger control-ownerhsip wedge experience higher
cost of debt. The results demonstrated in Lin et al. (2011) could stem from the cross-country
analysis to the extent that their results could be driven by cross-country variation in institutional
environments including legal systems, political economies and security laws. In contrast, our
results are based on a single country, Thailand. Further, our results contrast the views of Peyer
(2002) who finds that firms may use internal financing via their business group affiliations that
lead to weaker incentive to access external finance and lower cost of external financing. We
show in the next sub-section that lenders who are connected to family business groups do not
exert a statistically significant influence on the cost of debt.
Column 4 shows the results of firms with family involvement in management. We
observe a statistically significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO (-0.07) at the 5% level
(t-value is -2.50). This finding supports our hypothesis H3 and complements the findings of
Claessens et al. (2002), who find that controlling families can exert a strong influence on the
board to manage financial decisions via family management. However, our results are different
from those of Pan and Tian (2016); family management requires higher loan collateral in China
while family management in Thailand enjoys a lower cost of debt. A notable difference is that
the credit market in China is dominated by state-owned banks which tend to discriminate against
private loans so that more loans are allocated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than to privately
owned firms. As such, the latter firms are required to provide higher loan collateral than stateowned enterprises (SOEs) when debt financing is granted. This scenario is not present in
Thailand and consequently our results are different to those of Pan and Tian (2016).
Regarding the effects of firm characteristics on the cost of debt, the results are generally
consistent with the literature on cost of debt (Petersen & Rajan 1994; Chava et al. 2008; Zou &
Adams 2008; Kim et al. 2011). However, somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient estimates
associated with three firm characteristics, namely size, tangible assets intensity and leverage are
significant. We find that firms are more likely to have lower cost of debt when they are larger in
size; this is consistent with the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994). Similarly, Kim et al.
(2011) and Zou and Adams (2008) find a negative association between cost of debt and tangible
assets. Following Chava et al. (2008), cost of debt is also positively related to leverage. As well
as size, tangible assets and leverage, other firm characteristics are often found to be empirically
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important determinants of cost of debt in developed economies, like the U.S. and the U.K.,
which may not have any statistically significant effect on the cost of debt of Thai firms. The lack
of significance of other variables in explaining the cost of debt in our regression could in part be
due to differences in institutional environment and ownership structure.
To provide more insights into the behavior of family ownership on cost of debt, we
further examine the distribution of control rights of controlling families and those in firms with
family management. Here, we consider the ownership of families between 25% and 50% of
control rights, families which hold more than 50% of control rights, and family management. We
generate a dummy variable for Family 25-50% (Family 50% or more) which equals 1 for family
firms and have a member who holds between 25% and 50% (50% or more) of control rights and
0 otherwise. We also generate the dummy variable for Family_CEO which equals 1 for family
firms which have a member who serves as chairperson, CEO or the board of directors and 0
otherwise. To differentiate the effect of the different degrees of control ownership on the cost of
debt, family management on the cost of debt and the interaction between family management
and control ownership, we incorporate interactive dummies and include them in the regression as
follows:
Cost of debti,t = β0 + β1Family 25-50%i,t-1 + β2Family 50% or morei,t-1 + β3Family_CEOi,t-1 +
β4 (Family 25-50%i,t-1 * Family_CEOi,t-1)+
β5 (Family 50% or more * Family_CEOi,t-1)+ β6Sizei,t-1 + β7Tangiblei,t-1 +
β8Levi,t-1 + β9Currenti,t-1 + β10EBITDAi,t-1 + β11MBi,t-1 + β12Growthi,t-1 +
Dummy(year) + Dummy(industry) + εi,t-1

(2)

The definitions of the other variables are presented in Table 1. To determine how family
ownership and management exert their influence on the cost of debt and establish causality, we
use one-year lagged values of family ownership and management as well as other control
variables in our empirical estimation.
The results for regression (2) are reported in Table 6. Column 1 shows that the ownership
concentration of families may influence cost of debt in different ways. We find a negative
relationship between family ownership concentration and cost of debt. The estimated coefficient
is -0.01 when families hold 25-50% of control rights and this is statistically significant at the 5%
level (t-value is -2.32). The estimated coefficient is -0.06 for family control rights of 50% or
more of control rights and it is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -8.05). These
results indicate that family firms have lower cost of debt as controlling families hold more
shares. They also further support hypothesis H1. We also consider the distribution of control
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rights of controlling families in firms with family management by interacting the dummy
variable of Family_CEO with the control rights dummy variable of 25-50%, and 50% or more.
The results are reported in column 2. We find that Thai family firms have a negative impact on
the cost of debt when family members are involved in firm management. The estimated
coefficients of Family 25-50% of control rights and Family_CEO are -0.10 and -0.38,
respectively. They are, respectively, statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels (t-value are
-2.32 and -4.98 each). The estimated coefficients of the interactive variables between Family 2550%*Family_CEO, and Family 50% or more*Family_CEO are -0.40 and -0.32, respectively.
They are statistically significant at the 1% levels where the t-values are -4.77 and -3.40. These
findings suggest that the negative relationship between family ownership and cost of debt
becomes stronger when controlling families hold more shares and are involved in their firm’s
management. The net coefficient of Family_CEO on cost of debt with family ownership is -0.380.40-0.32 = -1.10. The net coefficient of Family 25-50% of control rights on cost of debt with
family management is -0.10-0.40 = -0.50 holding all else constant. These results support our
hypotheses H1 and H3. They show that, in Thailand, controlling families through their
involvement in firms’ management and control rights can reduce the cost of debt.
[Insert Table 6]

5.2 Reputational effect and long-term survivorship
To establish that controlling families are concerned with their long-term survivorship and
will manage their firms through their control and by establishing their creditors’ trustworthiness
thereby allowing them to borrow at a lower interest rate, we draw on the existing literature which
documents that family control has a significant effect on firm performance and profitability
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Firms which are concerned with their longterm survivorship tend to be profitable and are also more likely to be reputable. These attributes
may reduce credit concerns and the cost of debt. To further assess the channel governing the
results, we test whether the lower cost of debt is more pronounced in family firms with higher
profitability, which suggests that reputational effect and long-term survivorship characteristics of
family firms are important governing factors. We classify firms into two categories of firm
profitability based on three criteria: operating cash flow, return on assets and return on equity.
The first category is for firms with high profitability, which is defined as firms with abovemedian operating cash flow (OCF), above-median return on assets (ROA), or above-median
return on equity (ROE). The second category is for firms with low profitability, and these are
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firms with below-median operating cash flow (OCF), below-median return on assets (ROA), or
below-median return on equity (ROE). We then perform the regression equation (1) on the
subsamples for these two categories of firms.
[Insert Table 7]
Table 7 reports the results for low and high profitability firms in accordance to the three
criteria: operating cash flow (Panel A), return on assets (Panel B) and return on equity (Panel C).
In columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, we find that the lower cost of debt for family ownership structure is
concentrated in firms with high profitability. In column 2, the estimated coefficients of Family
range from -0.08 to -0.11, and they are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels (tvalue are between -1.93 and -2.79, respectively). The results in column 4 confirm these effects;
the estimated coefficients of ControlR range from -0.19 to -0.26, and they are statistically
significant at the 1% levels (t-value are between -2.62 and -3.42, respectively). The estimated
coefficients of ControlR in column 4 indicate that when firm profitability is above the median, a
one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR brings about a reduction in the cost of debt in the
4.9-6.8 percentage points range. It can be seen in columns 2 and 4 that these results are similar to
those reported in Table 6. However, the coefficients of Family and ControlR in columns 1 and 3,
which represent the sample of firms with low profitability, are not only insignificant, but they are
also smaller than those in columns 2 and 4. Taken together, these results suggest that the
negative association between family ownership structure and cost of debt is more pronounced in
firms with high profitability. These results provide strong support for our hypothesis H1 and are
consistent with the view that firms’ profitability is akin to enhancing firms’ reputation and
families’ long-term survivorship which make lower cost of debt possible (Anderson et al. 2003;
Anderson & Reeb 2003).
In columns 5 and 6 we find that the lower cost of debt associated with greater controlownership wedge is also concentrated in firms with high profitability. In column 6, the estimated
coefficients of Wedge range from -0.33 to -0.61, and they are statistically significant at the 5% or
1% levels (t-value are between -2.17 and -4.50, respectively), thus implying that when firm
profitability is above the median, a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge creates between
3.6 and 6.7 percentage points reduces the cost of debt. These results again are similar to those
reported in Table 6. However, the coefficients of Wedge in column 5, which represent lowprofitability firms, are insignificant and smaller in magnitude. Taken together, these results are
consistent with our hypothesis H2 and extend the work of Villalonga and Amit (2006), who find
that control-ownership wedge is associated with U.S. firm performance.
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In columns 7 and 8, the estimated coefficients of Family_CEO range between -0.09 and 0.12, and they are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels (t-value are from -2.17 to -2.97,
respectively). Again, these results are similar to those reported in Table 5. In contrast, in column
7, the coefficients of Family_CEO are not statistically significant, and they are smaller in
magnitude for firms with low profitability. These results reflect the fact that when firms are
highly profitable, creditors view family firms to be less likely to expropriate them, which
translates into a reduction in agency cost of debt.
5.3 Bank-connected lending of family firms
The established results on the reduced cost of debt effect of family firms could be also
driven by an alternative explanation that firms borrow from a lender that is controlled by or
connected to the same family business groups. Should the borrower and the lender belong to the
same family business group, it is probable that the borrower could obtain lower cost of debt. To
ameliorate this concern, we estimate regression (1) by incorporating an extra control variable,
Fambank which is a dummy variable equal to one for family firms that have connected lending
with banks via family business groups and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 8.
Family firms that have connected lending with banks is broadly defined as family firms whose
surname appears in the board of directors and who owns 5% or more of the banks’ shares. This
definition is broad enough to capture the possibility that family-related connections with lenders
could grant family firms the benefits of lower cost of debt.

[Insert Table 8]
It can be seen in Table 8 that across columns 1 to 4 for the different measures of
controlling families, the coefficients of interest for Family, ControlR, Wedge and Family_CEO
continue to be statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, with little changes
in the magnitude of these coefficients. These results are by and large confirming the robustness
of our results to the confounding effect of business lending arising from family related lenders.
We do not find any evidence to support the view that bank-connected lending of family firms is
associated with lower cost of debt. To further validate that controlling families long-term
survivorship and reputation are the factors that lead to lower cost of debt conditional on possible
family related business lending, we perform regression (2) by incorporating the dummy variable
Fambank. The results remain qualitatively unchanged from those shown in Table 7, justifying
that reputational concerns and long-term survivorship are the possible channels through which
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family firms could benefit from lower cost of debt. These results are not presented here for
brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
5.4 Robustness analyses
5.4.1 Alternative estimation methods concerning endogeneity issue
Endogeneity might be a problem when examining family control. There could be one
endogeneity concern that borrowers with certain ownership structures might have other firmspecific characteristics which have been unobserved in our previous regression models and may
influence the relationship between family control and the cost of debt (Lin et al. 2011). Another
endogeneity concern is that the association between family control and the cost of debts could be
simultaneously determined. It is possible that while family control affects the level of cost of
debt, the levels of cost of debt influence the decision of controlling families to retain their control
of the firm (Ma et al. 2017). Therefore, the reverse causality between family control and cost of
debt, and/or the joint determination of family control and other unobserved factors could
potentially bias our previous study. To mitigate these endogeneity issues and ascertain our
results from the previous models, we exploit an exogenous shock, the political uncertainty
occurring in Thailand that influences the relationship between family control and cost of debt. In
addition, we apply the random effect model and two-stage least squares (2SLS) method with
instrument variables, to check the results’ robustness.
First, following the results derived from a Hausman (1978) test, we use the random effect
model to address the potential endogeneity issue of unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity7.
We rerun regression (1) by using the random effect model, and report the results of our key
variables in columns 1 to 4 of Table 9. We find that the coefficients of Family and ControlR in
columns 1 and 2, respectively, are significantly negative which indicate that Thai listed firms
enjoy a lower cost of debt when controlling families are present and when controlling families
hold more shares. Column 3 focuses on firms with control-ownership wedge; we find that the
estimated coefficient of Wedge is significantly negative, suggesting that the cost of debt is lower
in Thai family firms with higher control-ownership wedge. Column 4 highlights firms with
family members’ involvement in management matters; we observe a statistically significant and
7

To test the robustness of the results, we estimate the results using fixed effects models and discover that the results
are statistically insignificant in all cases for the relationship between family control and cost of debt. This was
expected because the family control variables are time-invariant variables that do not change within firms. The
results are available from the authors upon request. In addition, the levels of family control remain nearly constant in
most of Thai family firms. From 2009 to 2015, there are small changes in ownership structure from family firms to
non-family firms and vice versa (3.37% of firms in the total sample size). Furthermore, changes in the level of
family management and control-ownership wedge are nearly the same during the sample period. Taken together, the
results suggest that endogeneity concern may not be prevalent in our study.
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negative coefficient of Family_CEO, implying that Thai family firms are associated with lower
debt cost when members are involved in the firm’s management. The results of the family
control variables based on the random effect model show that the signs of the coefficients and
levels of significance are consistent with the results reported in Table 5. Thus, the results of the
random effect confirm the robustness of our main findings, and family control potentially
influences the cost of debt when the endogeneity issue of unobserved characteristics is
considered.
Further, we apply a 2SLS approach to address simultaneity and reverse causality
between family control and the cost of debt. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we use the
values of the family control variables at the beginning of our sample as instruments. In the first
stage, we regress each endogenous family control variable on the instrument variables and all the
other control variables from equation (1). The F-statistics8 illustrate that the coefficients of the
instrument variables are significant, thus confirming our instrument variables are valid. In the
second stage, we apply the predicted values from the first-stage regressions as key independent
variables and we re-estimate regression (1). Results of the second stage regression are reported in
columns 5 to 8 of Table 9. The key variables of interest are negatively and significantly related
to cost of debt, which are consistent with the results documented in Table 5. Taken together, our
findings are consistent with our main hypotheses.
[Insert Table 9]
5.4.2 Matching sample
Another concern is that the association between family control and cost of debt could be
determined by other firm characteristics used as control variables in our main equation. To
address this issue, we construct a new sample using propensity score matching, following
Dehejia and Wahba (2002). We control for industry and year that influence the impact of family
control on cost of debt by matching across industry and year. Based on the literature, we also
control for firm characteristics that affect family control, which are Size, ROA, Beta, Lev, FCF
and MB. All variables are defined as per Table 1. A logit model is estimated to obtain propensity
scores for each treated firm (a family firm) and its matched control firm (a non-family firm). We
match each treated firm to one control firm in the same industry and year with the nearest
propensity score. The mean differences of the firm characteristics are reported in Panel A of

8

In the first stage, the F-statistics are unreported but they are available on request.
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Table 10. It can be seen that for all the firm characteristics, the treated firms and control firms
show no statistically significant difference in their mean values.
In Panel B of Table 10, we regress equation (1) based on the sample of treated and
control firms. The coefficients of family control variables, namely family ownership structure,
control-ownership wedge and family management are reported in columns 1 to 4. It is apparent
that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when compared to those based on the whole
sample (in Table 5).
[Insert Table 10]
5.4.3 Exogenous shock of political uncertainty and the effect of family control
We use the political uncertainty in Thailand as an exogenous shock to test whether our
main results are not driven by endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we conjecture that controlling
families might use internal resources to establish connections with new political elites during
political uncertainty to the extent that creditors may impose higher cost of debt. Empirically, we
construct two dummy variables to capture political turnovers. The first is Turnover which equals
1 for turnovers of political leaders at the province level and 0 otherwise. The second is Coup,
which equals 1 for the year 2014 when the coup d’état occurred and 0 for other years. Data on
Turnover are presented in Appendix 1. We incorporate in regression (1) the interaction terms
between these two dummy variables and different measures of family control. The estimation
results are reported in Table 11. Across the four regression specifications, the interaction terms
are our focus of interest. The results show that the coefficients of the interaction terms are
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the lower cost of debt enjoyed by family
firms is less pronounced during political uncertainty, which is consistent with our expectation.
[Insert Table 11]
5.4.4 Alternative proxies for controlling families, firm size and samples
We conduct a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of the results.9 To
explore whether our definition of controlling families matters for our results, we consider
different definitions of family ownership structure by changing the cut-off point from 25% of
control rights to 20%, following La Porta et al. (1999), and Faccio and Lang (2002). We also
apply alternative measure of firm size in our control variable. Referring to Anderson et al.
(2003), firm size can be defined as the natural logarithm of firms’ debt and equity (Size_growth).

9

All results are available from the authors upon request.
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Furthermore, we explore the sensitivity of our results by excluding utilities companies; it is often
argued these companies are government regulated and are not entirely able to set their own
policies, such as capital structure. All results remain qualitatively unchanged.
6. Conclusion
Traditionally, Thai firms have relied heavily on bank debt for their external finances.
Equally, family control has played a very crucial role in many Thai businesses which have
traditionally formed the backbone of the country’s economy. In this paper we examine the link
between family control and cost of debt when family firms obtain external debt finance. Using
cost of debt to measure firms’ ability to secure debt finances externally, we find that family
control benefits from lower cost of debt compared to non-family firms. The benefits of lower
cost of debt are more pronounced when family firms have larger family ownership, larger
control-ownership wedge, and are involved in day-to-day management. We fail to find any
evidence that bank-connected lending of family firms leads to lower cost of debt. We show that
the reputation and long-term survivorship characteristics of family firms as proxied by their high
profitability are the channels which give rise to lower cost of debt. The evidence is consistent
with the view that Thai controlling families have incentives to take a long-term and low risk
approach in running firms, and they are less prone to expropriating other investors despite
Thailand’s weak institutional environment.
Our results are also robust to possible endogeneity issues and continue to hold for
different proxies of family control and control variables, and for matched samples. We further
document that the negative relationship between family control and cost of debt becomes weaker
in the presence of political uncertainty engendered by the 2014 coup d’état and changes in the
provincial level politicians over the sample period. By and large, our findings may be
generalized to other economies and markets with weak institutional environments and a lack of
arm’s length market-driven system. The low cost of debt enjoyed by family firms is instrumental
in their continued success and for the vital role they play in the Thai economy.
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Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable name
Variable definition
Panel A: cost of debt and ownership structure
Cost of debt
Interest expense/ total debt.
Family
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms
ControlR
The control rights held by the controlling families
Wedge
Divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of
controlling shareholders
Family_CEO
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a family
member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors
and 0 for family firms that do not have a family member as the
chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors
Family 25-50%
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a member
of the family who holds between 25% and 50% of control rights
and 0 for family firms that do not have a member of the family
who holds between 25% and 50%
Family 50% or more
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a member
of the family who holds more than 50% of control rights and 0
for family firms that do not have a member of the family who
holds more than 50%
Panel B: firm characteristics
Firm size (Size)
Tangible assets intensity (Tangible)
Leverage (Lev)
Current ratio (Current)
EBITDA
MB
Growth
Size_growth
Return of assets (ROA)
Beta
Free cash flow (FCF)
Operating cash flow (OCF)
Return on equity (ROE)
Industry dummy
Panel C: Political uncertainty events
Political turnover (Turnover)

Coup

Natural log of firm total assets
Tangible assets/ total assets
Total debt/ total assets
Current assets/ current liabilities
Earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization/
total assets
Market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value
of debt) divided by the book value of total assets
Percentage change of total sales
Natural log of firms’ debt and equity
Net income/total assets
Firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk
Free cash flow/ total assets
Operating cash flow/ total assets
Retained earnings/total equity
Dummy variable equals 1 for firms in a given industry and 0
otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 when the local politician is newly
appointed and 0 when the local politician is not newly
appointed. If politicians took office from January 1 to June 30,
then the current year represents the year they took office: if
politicians took office from July 1 to December 31, then the
following year represents the year they took office
Dummy variable equals 1 when Thailand in 2014 is governed
by the 2014 coup leaders and 0 otherwise
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Table 2 Sample Distribution
This table reports sample constituents Panel A shows the number and percentage of Thai listed companies which
can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel B shows the percentage of control-ownership
wedge and the number of family firms with family management within family firms for each year. Panel C shows
the number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry for family and non-family firms for the sample
period. Panel D shows the number and percentage of firm-year observations by bank-connected lending via family
business groups. Definitions of all variables are based on those listed in Table 1.
Year
2009
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations
1. Family firms
170
2. Non-family firms
116
Total
286
Panel B: Within family firms
(N=1,306)
1. Control-ownership wedge (mean in
%)
2. Family management (number of
firms)

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

172
121
293

167
130
297

174
125
299

199
123
322

212
123
335

212
123
335

1,306
861
2,167

5.81

5.39

5.41

5.84

6.08

6.03

5.69

5.77

165

167

164

170

189

202

202

1,259

Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry
Industry group
Industry description
All firms Family
firms
Agro & Food
Industry
Consumer
Products
Industrials

Property &
Construction
Resources
Services

Technology

Non-family
firms

Percentage
of family
firms (%)
72.53

Agribusiness, food & beverage

222

161

61

Fashion, home & office products,
personal products &
pharmaceuticals
Automotive,
industrial materials & machinery,
packaging,
paper & printing materials,
petrochemicals & chemicals,
steel
Construction materials,
construction services,
property development,
Energy & utilities,
mining
Commerce,
health care services,
media & publishing,
professional services,
tourism & leisure,
transportation & logistics
Electronic components,
information & communication
Total

164

128

36

78.05

419

260

159

62.05

520

321

199

61.73

193

80

113

41.45

442

259

183

58.60

207

97

110

46.86

2,167

1,306

861

60.27

Panel D: Number and percentage of firm-year observations by bank-connected lending within family firms
(N=1,306)
Number of firm-year observations Percentage of total firm-year observations
Connected lending via family 68
5.2%
business groups
Non-connected lending via
1,238
94.8%
family business groups
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Table 3 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy
variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the
controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling
shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the
chairperson, CEO or is on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. Tangible
is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Current is the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to
total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity
plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions of all other variables are based on
those listed in Table 1. For Wedge and Family_CEO, summary statistics are reported for the sample of firm-year
observations within family firms, whereas in the regressions, firm-year observations include total firms.
25th percentile

Median

75th
percentile

Standard
deviation

Panel A: Cost of debt, ownership structure
factors
Cost of debt (%)
2,167
6.044

3.073

4.503

6.617

5.389

Family
ControR (%)
Wedge (%)
Family_CEO

0.599
28.845
5.774
0.966

0
0
0
1

1
33.000
0
1

1
50.229
7.982
1

0.490
26.032
10.945
0.181

8.542
37.717
47.150
1.991
8.740
7.106
1.430

7.515
18.148
32.721
0.962
3.695
-7.541
0.917

8.349
35.931
47.353
1.392
8.350
5.523
1.156

9.409
54.830
61.615
2.355
13.648
18.316
1.629

1.463
22.776
20.170
1.774
9.050
25.115
0.864

Observation

2,167
2,167
1,306
1,306

Panel B: Firm characteristics
Size
2,167
Tangible (%)
2,167
Lev (%)
2,167
Current
2,167
EBITDA (%)
2,167
Growth (%)
2,167
MB
2,167

Mean

Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample
Number of firm-year
observations
1. Family firms
1,306
2. Non-family firms
861
2.1 Government
125
2.2 Foreign investor
321
2.3 Group
15
2.4 Widely held
400
Total
2,167
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Percentage of total firm-year
observations
60.27%
39.73%
5.77%
14.81%
0.69%
18.46%
100%

Table 4 Univariate Analysis
This table reports the univariate analysis. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Size is the natural
log of firm total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest
taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. MB is the market
value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions
of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Cost of debt (%)

Family firms
(N=1,306)
Mean
5.750

Non-family firms
(N=861)
Mean
6.481

Size

8.412

8.736

Tangible (%)

37.589

37.909

Lev (%)

46.568

48.020

Current

2.107

1.818

EBITDA (%)

9.351

7.829

Growth (%)

8.115

5.599

MB

1.480

1.354

32

Difference tests
(t-Stat)
-0.73%**
(2.992)
-0.32***
(4.890)
-0.32%
(0.3092)
-1.45%
(1.586)
0.29***
(-3.602)
1.52%***
(-3.714)
2.52%**
(-2.208)
0.14**
(-3.218)

Table 5 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is the ratio of
interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights
and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the
natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt)
divided by the book value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and
amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model,
respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family

Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-0.07***
(-2.65)

ControlR

(2)

(3)

-0.17***
(-3.23)

Wedge

-0.16*
(-1.88)

Family_CEO
Size
MB
Tangibility
Current
EBITDA
Growth
Lev
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

-0.05***
(-5.64)
-0.11
(-1.12)
-0.51**
(-2.34)
-0.01
(-0.35)
-0.01
(-0.17)
-0.07
(-1.35)
0.02***
(4.41)
0.12***
(10.73)
Yes
Yes
0.059
1,806

-0.05***
(-5.74)
-0.10
(-1.04)
-0.50**
(-2.29)
-0.01
(-0.34)
-0.01
(-0.09)
-0.07
(-1.30)
0.02***
(4.42)
0.10***
(14.41)
Yes
Yes
0.061
1,806
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-0.04***
(-5.37)
-0.13
(-1.31)
-0.55**
(-2.54)
-0.01
(-0.62)
-0.02
(-0.31)
-0.09
(-1.53)
0.02***
(4.87)
0.11***
(10.43)
Yes
Yes
0.055
1,806

-0.07**
(-2.50)
-0.05***
(-5.61)
-0.10
(-1.06)
-0.50**
(-2.32)
-0.01
(-0.34)
-0.01
(-0.18)
-0.08
(-1.38)
0.02**
(4.26)
0.12***
(10.67)
Yes
Yes
0.058
1,806

Table 6 Family Ownership Structure, Family Management and Cost of Debt
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is the ratio of
interest expense to total debt. Family 25-50% is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a
member of the family who holds between 25% and 50% of control rights and 0 otherwise. Family 50% or more is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a member of the family who holds more than 50% of
control rights and 0 otherwise. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a
family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry
dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Definitions of all other
variables are based on those listed in Table 1. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family 25-50%
Family 50% or more

Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-0.01**
(-2.32)
-0.06***
(-8.05)

Family_CEO
Family 25-50%*Family_CEO
Family 50% or more*Family_CEO
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

0.10***
(15.03)
Yes
Yes
0.057
1,806
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(2)
-0.10**
(-2.32)
-0.06
(-1.01)
-0.38***
(-4.98)
-0.40***
(-4.77)
-0.32***
(-3.40)
0.12***
(10.80)
Yes
Yes
0.069
1,806

Table 7 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt and Firm Profitability
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is the ratio of
interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights
and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. OCF is the
ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. ROE is the ratio of retained
earnings to total equity. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects
in this model, respectively. Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 1. Columns 1, 3, 5,
and 7 use the sub-sample with low profitability firms. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 use the sub-sample with high
profitability firms. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Profitability sub-sample
Low
High
Low
OLS
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: OCF
Family

-0.04
(-1.14)

High

Low

High

Low

High

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.25
(0.98)

-0.48***
(-3.99)
-0.02
(-0.67)
Yes
Yes
0.089
906

-0.09**
(-2.20)
Yes
Yes
0.085
900

-0.02
(-0.76)
Yes
Yes
0.108
912

-0.09**
(-2.17)
Yes
Yes
0.078
894

-0.01
(-0.00)
Yes
Yes
0.077
884

-0.12***
(-2.97)
Yes
Yes
0.086
922

-0.08**
(-2.03)

ControlR

-0.07
(-1.01)

-0.19***
(-2.66)

Wedge
Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations
Panel B: ROA
Family

Yes
Yes
0.090
906

Yes
Yes
0.084
900

-0.05
(-1.30)

-0.08*
(-1.93)

ControlR

Yes
Yes
0.089
906

Yes
Yes
0.087
900

-0.08
(-1.10)

-0.19***
(-2.62)

Wedge

Yes
Yes
0.089
906

Yes
Yes
0.085
900

0.29
(1.25)

-0.61***
(-4.50)

Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations
Panel C: ROE
Family

Yes
Yes
0.109
912

Yes
Yes
0.077
894

-0.01
(-0.41)

-0.11***
(-2.79)

ControlR

Yes
Yes
0.109
912

Yes
Yes
0.080
894

-0.04
(-0.65)

-0.26***
(-3.42)

Wedge

Yes
Yes
0.110
912

Yes
Yes
0.081
894

0.06
(0.26)

-0.33**
(-2.17)

Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

Yes
Yes
0.077
884

Yes
Yes
0.085
922

Yes
Yes
0.077
884

Yes
Yes
0.088
922
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Yes
Yes
0.077
884

Yes
Yes
0.078
922

Table 8 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt
(Controlling for Bank-Connected Lending of Family Firms)
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is the ratio of
interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights
and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the
natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt)
divided by the book value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and
amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Fambank is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have connected lending with banks via
family business groups and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and
industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family

Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-0.07***
(-2.73)

ControlR

(2)

(3)

-0.16***
(-3.29)

Wedge

-0.17**
(-1.97)

Family_CEO
Size
MB
Tangibility
Current
EBITDA
Growth
Lev
Fambank
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

-0.05***
(-5.63)
-0.11
(-1.17)
-0.51**
(-2.33)
-0.01
(-0.34)
-0.01
(-0.10)
-0.07
(-1.32)
0.02***
(4.78)
0.10
(1.26)
0.12***
(10.72)
Yes
Yes
0.061
1,806

-0.05***
(-5.72)
-0.10
(-1.09)
-0.50**
(-2.28)
-0.01
(-0.33)
-0.01
(-0.01)
-0.07
(-1.28)
0.02***
(4.78)
0.10
(1.22)
0.12***
(10.76)
Yes
Yes
0.062
1,806
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-0.04***
(-5.35)
-0.13
(-1.36)
-0.55**
(-2.54)
-0.01
(-0.62)
-0.02
(-0.25)
-0.09
(-1.52)
0.02***
(5.24)
0.10
(1.16)
0.11***
(10.42)
Yes
Yes
0.057
1,806

-0.07**
(-2.58)
-0.05***
(-5.59)
-0.11
(-1.11)
-0.50**
(-2.31)
-0.01
(-0.33)
-0.01
(-0.11)
-0.08
(-1.36)
0.02**
(4.61)
0.10
(1.25)
0.12***
(10.66)
Yes
Yes
0.060
1,806

Table 9 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt
(Addressing Endogeneity Concerns)
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using random effect and 2SLS models. Cost of
debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and
0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence
between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which
equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0
otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus
book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets.
Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes,
depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total
debt to total assets. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in
this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family
ControlR

Cost of debt
Random effects
(1)
(2)
-0.05***
(-4.29)
-0.15**
(-1.93)

Wedge

(3)

2SLS
(5)
-0.06**
(-1.99)

(6)

-0.24*
(-1.86)
Yes
Yes
0.034
1,806

Yes
Yes
0.058
1,806

(7)

(8)

-0.14**
(-2.55)

Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

Yes
Yes
0.031
1,806

-0.11
(-0.65)
-0.04**
(-2.10)
Yes
Yes
0.033
1,806
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Yes
Yes
0.058
1,754

Yes
Yes
0.060
1,754

Yes
Yes
0.055
1,754

-0.06**
(-2.15)
Yes
Yes
0.058
1,754

Table 10 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt
(Propensity Score Matching Approach)
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using the propensity score matching approach
(PSM) and an OLS model. In Panel A, the control sample is for firms in the same industry and year, and is based on
firm characteristics like Size, ROA, Beta, Lev, FCF and MB. In Panel B, Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 use the matching
sample. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for
family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy
variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of
directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market value of assets (market value
of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to
total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest
taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio
of total debt to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is firm’s beta value reflecting
systematic risk. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to
control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Treated sample
Mean
Panel A: Matching sample difference tests
Size
8.494
ROA (%)
4.344
Beta
0.825
Lev (%)
48.600
FCF (%)
1.179
MB (%)
1.320
Observations
742
Panel B: Matching sample analysis
Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
Family
-0.08**
(-2.45)
ControlR

Control sample
Mean

Difference (t-value)

8.570
3.776
0.879
48.542
1.565
1.370
742

(2)

-0.076 (-1.01)
0.568% (1.11)
-0.054 (-1.60)
0.058% (0.05)
-0.386% (-0.69)
-0.05% (-1.23)

(3)

-0.19***
(-3.12)

Wedge

-0.03*
(-1.71)

Family_CEO
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

0.11***
(7.65)
Yes
Yes
0.075
1,272

0.11***
(7.74)
Yes
Yes
0.077
1,272
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0.11***
(7.28)
Yes
Yes
0.069
1,272

-0.07**
(-2.26)
0.11***
(7.60)
Yes
Yes
0.074
1,272

Table 11 The Effects of Political Uncertainty at Provincial and National Levels on the
Relationship between Family Control and Cost of Debt
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is the ratio of
interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights
and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Coup is a
dummy variable which equals one when Thailand in 2014 was governed by the coup leaders and 0 otherwise.
Turnover is a dummy variable which equals one when the local politician is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If
politicians took office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year represents the year they took office: if
politicians took office from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents the year they took office.
Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model,
respectively. Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 1. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the
full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.

Family control proxies
Coup
Coup*Family control proxies
Turnover
Turnover*Family control proxies
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Sum test (F-value)
R2
Observations

Cost of debt
(1)
Family
-0.09***
(-8.79)
-1.02***
(-12.68)
0.01*
(1.65)
-0.02*
(-1.95)
0.06***
(4.58)
0.12***
(10.02)
Yes
Yes
5.89***
0.071
1,737

(2)
ControlR
-0.12***
(-19.25)
-0.10***
(-12.83)
0.04***
(4.74)
-0.01*
(-1.65)
0.09**
(2.50)
0.12***
(10.04)
Yes
Yes
6.07***
0.072
1,737
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(3)
Wedge
-0.04
(-0.23)
-0.08
(-1.47)
0.07
(0.73)
-0.01
(-0.22)
0.10
(0.06)
0.11***
(9.67)
Yes
Yes
6.50***
0.068
1,737

(4)
Family_CEO
-0.09***
(-17.11)
-1.00***
(-12.92)
0.03***
(5.02)
-0.03**
(-2.39)
0.06***
(3.55)
0.12***
(10.01)
Yes
Yes
5.82***
0.070
1,737
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Appendix 1: Turnover of Politicians in Thailand by Province and Year (2009-2015)
This table reports the turnover of politicians in Thailand by province and year over the sample period 2009-2015.
Number

Province

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

1

Ayutthya

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

Bangkok

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

3

Buriram

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

4

Chacherngsao

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

5

Chainart

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

6

Chiang Mai

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

7

Chiang Rai

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

8

Chonburi

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

9

Chumphon

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

10

Khon Kaen

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

11

Krabi

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

12

Lampang

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

13

Lamphun

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

14

Nakhon Ratchasima

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

15

Naknorn Sawan

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

16

Nakorn Phathum

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

17

Nonthaburi

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

18

Pathum Thani

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

19

Prachinburi

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

20

Rayong

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

21

Roi Et

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

22

Samut Prakarn

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

23

Samut Sakhon

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

24

Saraburi

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

25

Songkhla

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

26

Surat Thani

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

27

Udon Thani

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

Total change

23

14

16

18

15

15

11
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